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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD JACQUES, by and through 
his guardian, ad litem, Pauline Murphy, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
DALLAS FARRIMOND, by and 
through his guardian ad litem, Thomas 
Smith Farrimond and THOMAS 
SMITH FARRIMOND, personally, 
Defendants-Resp!. mien f. 
t ~ 
Case No. 
9724 
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Appeal from the judgment of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, 
Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge. 
JOHN E. STONE 
MARK S. MINER, 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
816 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD JACQUES, by and through 
his guardian, ad litem, Pauline Murphy, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
DALLAS FARRIMOND, by and 
through his guardian ad litem, Thomas 
Smith Farrimond and THOMAS 
SMITH FARRIMOND, personally, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9724 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for loss of eye, 
kidney, one-half of his liver, and other serious personal 
injuries by boy plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A jury in District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, awarded $20,000.00 general damages in a spe-
cial verdict. District Judge A. H. Ellett entered a verdict 
of "No Cause of Action" by reason of the jury answer-
ing "Yes" to a special interrogatory which asked, "Did 
Richard Jacques voluntarily assume the risks incident 
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to the manner in which Dallas Farrimond was driving the 
car insofar as intoxication and wilful misconduct were 
concerned?" 
A motion for a new trial was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1. That jury's verdict be reinstated, or in the alter-
native, 
2. That plaintiff be granted a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Richard Jacques, a 16 year old minor, was critically 
injured on January 4, 1961 when the defendant, Dallas 
Farrimond's, automobile, in which the plaintiff was rid-
ing in right rear seat as a guest, went out of control and 
sheared off a utility pole near 2085 Viewmont Drive in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The vehicle was east 
bound on Viewmont Drive when it went out of control 
and skidded 124 feet, clipped a utility pole and then skid-
ded sideways for an additional 67 feet. Farrimond, who 
is usually a careful driver and well acquainted with the 
area and road, never applied his brakes. (Tr. 184) The 
plaintiff, Richard Jacques, was riding in the right rear 
seat of the car which struck the pole and caused him to 
suffer the following injuries: 
a. Severe injury to his right side and both sides of 
his chest. 
b. Multiple severe scalp, face and eye lacerations, 
with total destruction of his right eye by a lacer-
ation which passed through the eyeball. 
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c. Severe contusions of right lung, with multiple 
rib and costochondral fractures on both sides of 
his chest, resulting in partial rotation of the ster-
num. 
d. Fracture of right scapula .and left sternal clavical 
joint. 
e. Severe multiple lacerations of the right lobe of 
the liver and colon. 
f. Destruction of right kidney, necessitating removal. 
g. Lacerations of right hand. 
h. Cerebral concussion. 
The pertinent events leading up to a catastrophic 
collision commenced about 7: 15 P.M. when the defen-
dant, Dallas Farrimond, drove his 1955 Buick Super au-
tomobile to the plaintiff's home to pick him up. Imme-
diately thereafter, Dwight Tolley, Dick Gorringe, Rich-
ard Rhead and George Ligeros were called for and Farri-
mond drove to the House of Pizza which is situated at 
21st South and 9th East. Farrimond, Jacques, Rhead and 
Tolley all testified there was no drinking by Farrimond 
until he reached the House of Pizza and plaintiff's attor-
ney made no claim to his prior drinking. (Tr. 245, Tr 
177) At approximately 9:30P.M., George Ligeros was 
given a bottle of gin which had two or three inches of gin 
in the bottom. Farrimond testified that Ligeros brought 
the gin out to his car where it was mixed with 76 mixer 
and consumed by Ligeros, Jacques and himself. The plain-
tiff, Jacques, denied drinking. The collision occurred at 
approximately 10:00 P.M. 
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Defendant Farrimond further testified that he met 
Arlene Huntzinger at the House of Pizza and was quite 
upset over the fact that she had driven there in another 
man's car; (Tr. 156, Tr 179) and further infuriated when 
told she expected to marry another man. (Tr 364) While 
this episode was going on, the other boys were outside 
engaged in a dough fight. Jacques had no knowledge 
whatsoever of any dispute between Farrimond and his 
girl friend. It was agreed that Farrimond was usually 
a careful driver. Arlene Huntzinger, his girl friend, left 
the House of Pizza first then Farrimond decided to go 
out to her home. Farrimond testified that the boys got 
in his car and drove down 9th East to 39th South, up 
39th South to 13th East, out 13th East to 48th South, up 
48th South to Viewmont Drive and southeast on View-
mont Drive to point of collision, which was within a 
hundred or so feet from the Huntzinger home. It is undis-
puted that Farrimond drove at excessive rates of speed 
(Tr 365) on 9th East. It is also undisputed that he fav-
orably responded to protests made by (Tr 365, Tr 151) 
the guests and drove more carefully up to the time he 
commenced speeding down Viewmont Drive. (Tr 183, Tr 
186, Tr 187, Tr 222) At this point Richard Rhead said, 
"Dallas, you won't make this corner going this fast." Far-
rimond disregarded the warning and the collision ensued. 
Farrimond admitted he was well-acquainted with the 
road (Tr 184) and the general area and had travelled 
it many times before. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NUMBER ONE: 
The trial court erred in formulating the special ver-
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diet by requiring jury to find conclusions of law rather 
than ultimate conclusions of fact. 
POINT NUMBER TWO: 
The trial court erred not finding as a matter of law 
in this case that the defense of assumption of risk cannot 
be used against wilful misconduct. 
POINT NUMBER THREE: 
The trial court erred in instructing on negligence 
and contributory negligence when these matters were not 
in issue. 
POINT NUMBER ONE: Examination of the in-
terrogatories in the special verdict which was given to the 
jury by the court reveals the following matters: (Tr 81) 
Question No. 1: Was Dallas Farrimond intoxi-
cated immediately prior to the collision? Answer. Yes. 
This was a question which would require an ultimate 
fact which could properly be answered by the jury. -
The court continued - If so, was the intoxication a proxi-
mate cause of the collision? Answer. Yes. 
The question of proximate cause will be reserved 
for a later argument and included in our general article. 
Question No. 2. Immediately prior to the collision, 
was Dallas Farrimond guilty of wilful misconduct? An-
swer. Yes. 
If so, was such wilful misconduct a proximate cause 
of the collision? Answer. Yes. 
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Question No. 3. During the trip and immediately 
prior to the collision, did Richard Jacques voluntarily 
assume the risks in the manner in which Dallas Farri-
mond driving the car in so far as the intoxication and 
wilful misconduct is concerned? Answer. Yes. 
Question No. 4. During the trip immediately prior 
to the collision, did Richard Jacques encourage Dallas 
Farrimond to drive at an excessive rate of speed? Answer. 
No. 
Question No. 5. Showing by the preponderance of 
the evidence of the case, what amount of money would 
fairly and adequately recompense Richard Jacques for 
any and all damages he has sustained as a result of the 
collision? (See Instruction No. 19.) 
Answer. $20,000.00. 
It is the appellant's contention in this case that the 
two questions, one regarding wilful misconduct and the 
other regarding assumption of risk were in effect submit-
ting to the jury a requirement of them to answer ques-
tions of law rather than ultimate questions of fact. The 
function of a special verdict with its interrogatories is to 
obviate sympathy verdicts in personal injury cases but in 
endeavoring to do away with said sympathy verdicts, the 
questions themselves should not become so onerous, so 
involved, so oppressive that the function itself is lost sight 
of and the reverse of what is intended happens and that 
justice itself is lost by the use of said special verdicts. It 
is admitted that it throws an unduly oppressive burden 
on the jury, even with instructions, to make definitive an-
swers in connection with complex concepts of the law 
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such as wilful misconduct and assumption of risk where 
the courts themselves are, to a large extent, in a quandry 
as to exactly what they mean. There are extensive annota-
tions in the American Law Reports on both issues that the 
fact that the jury was being confused by both of the con-
cepts is indicated by these portions of the record: 
On page 452 of the record at line 6, the court says: 
"I was about to call you in to talk to you about going to 
dinner. The bailiff suggested that you may have some 
questions. You can be seated if you wish to. Do you have 
a question that you would like to talk to me about?" 
Then the court proceeds to answer the question 
made by the foreman of the jury, Mr. Alder, on line 24, 
as follows: 
"MR. ALDER: We want to know about misconduct, 
the amount - whether a person voluntarily speeds is 
guilty of misconduct?" 
Then we have an elaborate explanation by the court 
on line 18 of page 453 where the court proceeds to ex-
plain wanton misconduct: 
"MRS. SA VILLE : Is wilful misconduct almost the 
same as wilfully wanting to kill somebody?" 
Then there is another explanation of the court; that 
it doesn't mean exactly to kill someone; and so the col-
loquy proceeds, indicating that the jury is hopelessly lost 
in a maze of legal technicalities in connection with the 
concept of wilful misconduct. 
With regard to the concept of assumption of risk, we 
find in the record on page 45 7 the following questions and 
answers : line 18. 
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"No. III. During the trip and immediately prior to 
the collision did Richard Jacques voluntarily assume the 
risks incident to the manner in which Dallas Farrimond 
was driving the car insofar as intoxication and wilful mis-
conduct were concerned?" The answer is "Yes." 
That is signed by Mrs. Saville, Mr. Shaw, Mr. Wil-
helmsen, Mr. Driscoll, Mr. England, Mr. Pack, and Mr. 
Jackson. Let's see. Mr. Alder did not sign that. Beg par-
don? 
MR. ALDER: That may have been unintentional. 
THE COURT: Did you mean to sign that? 
MR. ALDER: Read that again. 
THE COURT: "During the trip and immediately 
prior to the collision did Richard Jacques voluntarily as-
sume the risks incident ·to the manner in which Dallas 
Farrimond was driving the car insofar as intoxication 
and wilful misconduct were concerned?" 
MR. ALDER: We discussed that quite a bit, Judge, 
and we figured that he was not compelled to ride in that 
car, and in that way he was assuming the risk. Now, you 
can put my name on that if that is-
THE COURT: No, you will have to put your own. 
If under my instructions you think that he with knowledge 
of this trouble rode in that car, then he did assume the 
risk. 
~1R. ALDER: No one knew at that time when he 
was in the car that they \vere going to be in the wreck, 
but he was riding in the car wilfully and not being com-
pelled is the way they decided this. 
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THE COURT: Of course, you can't explain your 
verdict after you are out. There can't be any explanations, 
but if there is any question, I want you to read my 
instruction on that. 
Court proceeds to read his instruction. 
Now it is true that the deliberations of the jury in 
connection with how they arrived at their verdict may 
not be a proper matter for the record, but it is a proper 
matter of the record for the Supreme Court of Utah 
to determine the confusion that is extant in the minds 
of the jury when they are actually called upon to 
determine questions of law riding under the guise of 
ultimate questions of fact. 
It is further significant and interesting to note that 
the eagerness of the jury to please the trial judge, and 
the record reveals the friendliness of the trial judge with 
the jury; and it might be added as a sidenote that it is 
the function of a trial court to formally present the law 
to the jury, and that is all; and it is the function of the 
jury not to try to determine which way the judge is 
thinking concerning the facts, but to make the finding 
of fact themselves objectively. 
POINT NUMBER TWO: So far as we can deter-
mine, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has 
not determined the precise issue of whether assumption 
of risk can be used as a defense against- wilful misconduct. 
It is alluded to in Ferguson vs. ]ongsma 10 Utah 2nd 
179. In that case, the distinction was made between 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk at page 
190 it states that: "Contributory negligence is based 
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upon carelessness, inadvertence and unintended risk but 
assumption of risk requires an intelligent and deliberate 
choice to assume a known risk. Assumption of risk re-
quires knowledge by plaintiff of a specific defect or 
dangerous condition caused by the defendants negligence 
or lacking of due care which the plaintiff could have 
voluntarily and deliberately avoided and thereby assumed 
the risks of in juries he sustained. On the other hand, 
contributory negligence requires evidence only that plain-
tiff failed to use the care for his own safety which an 
ordinary reasonable and prudent person could use under 
the existing circumstances.'' 
In Milligan vs. Harwood 11 Utah 7 2nd 74 with 
regards to intoxication, it is stated on page 76: "Of 
course if the plaintiff would have known Harwood was 
intoxicated at the time they embarked on the journey, 
he would probably be in the position of having assumed 
the risk." 
In the main annotation on this subject in American 
Law Reports, 44 ALR 2nd 1342, CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE, ASSUMPTION OF RISK, OR RE-
LATED DEFENSES AS AVAILABLE IN ACTION 
BASED ON AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE OR 
SIMILAR COMl\10N-LAW RULE, at page 1347 Sec-
tion 3, ASSUMPTION OF RISK: 
"In jurisdictions which recognize a rule of assump-
tion of risk as distinct from the defense of contributory 
negligence, it has usually been held that this defense 
is available to an automobile host charged with wilful 
or wanton misconduct or recklessness, even though the 
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guest's contributory negligence might not bar his re-
covery." Citing California, Colorado, Connecticut and 
Florida cases and others. 
It is further stated on page 134 7 supra: "Assert-
ing that the doctrine of assumption of risk was not 
restricted to cases where there was a contract relationship 
between the parties, and that, under certain circum-
stances, it might operate in the field of negligence, the 
court in Freedman v. Hurwitz ( 1933) 116 Conn 283, 164 
A 647, said that when so applicable in negligence actions 
the principle was distinct from that of contributory 
negligence, and that therefore the fact that contributory 
negligence was not a defense to an action under the 
guest statute did not in itself prevent the defense of 
asssumption of risk in a proper case. The court went 
on to say, however, that the doctrine operated in a 
strictly limited field, since it must tbe shown, in order 
to bar recovery thereunder, that the injured person had 
known or ought reasonably to have perceived that the 
risk existed and that unless he took steps to protect 
himself he would be liable to injury, and that the in-
curring of the risk must be really voluntary." 
See also the Restatement of Torts Sec. 482 and 503 
( 2) which provides that pl¥Lintiffs contributory negli-
gence shall not bar recovery from harm caused by the 
defendants reckless disregard for plaintiffs safety, but 
that a plaintiff is barred from recovery from harm 
caused by defendants reckless misconduct if knowing 
of such misconduct and the danger to himself involved 
therein, the plaintiff recklessly exposes himself thereto 
(emphasis ours). This comment points out that the plain-
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tiff is not barred by failure to exercise reasonable care 
after knowing that the recklessness conduct and the 
dangers involved therein. Now even by that form of 
negligence known as voluntarily assumption of risk, but 
only 'vhere he only knows of the reckless misconduct, but 
also realizes the gravity of the risk involved so that he 
is not only unreasonably, but recklessly exposing himself. 
So it will be seen, then, that the doctrine enunciated 
in the American Law reports that the assumption of 
risk is a defense to wilful misconduct involves a par-
ticular and peculiar type of assumption of risk and that 
is where the conduct of the plaintiff himself equals or 
exceeds an indifference of recklessness or wanton con-
duct of the defendant. It will also be seen that it was 
the plaintiff's contention statement of facts that first: 
the defendant was intoxicated, which wasn't apparent 
to the plaintiff or to any of the others, and secondly, that 
the defendant had that night a personal clash with his 
girl friend and that he was in the process of trying 
to reach her home in the fastest way possible with the 
utmost disregard for the safety of his guests. Therefore, 
under the statement of facts that the most favorable view 
that the reviewing court could take in favor of the 
defendant that it was apparent that none of the guests 
in that automobile could have known of either (a) the 
intoxication of the defendant, or (b) his reckless state 
of mind existing, because of his argument with his girl 
friend. 
POINT NUMBER THREE: To add to the welter 
of blundering confusion created by the trial court in 
this matter, the trial court pre-emptorily and in dis-
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regard of a ruling by the judge at the pretrial - arbi-
trarily ruled and instructed upon negligence, contri-
butory negligence, reasonable care, due care, ordinary 
care, all of which had no issue or bearing on the case 
which in turn added to the already confused minds of 
the jury. (Tr. 74) 
CONCLUSION 
It will be seen from a review of the facts of law in 
this case that special scrutiny and attention must be 
paid to the whole concept of special verdicts. While it 
is true that the primary function is to have them deter-
mine the operative facts upon which the court can then 
draw legal conclusions in order to avoid sympathy 
verdicts, at the same time, it can be a double edged 
sword and the function and purpose for what it was 
devised can be a cutting tool to severe justice itself. It 
can become a tool to use to bewilder the minds of the 
jury with the end result is that it accomplishes the 
opposite of what it intends to do. 
We submit that in the instant case that this is 
exactly what happened and therefore respectfully request 
that the decision be reversed and that the appellant 
herein be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN E. STONE 
MARK S. MINER 
816 Newhouse Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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